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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to understand why financial reforms carried out 
in several Latin Arrerican countries during the 1970s, ained at ending 
"financial repression," as defined by Ronald McKinnon (see for example, 
McKinnon 1980), and generally seeking to free danestic capital markets 
fran usury laws and other alleged government-induced distortions, 
yielded by 1983 danestic financial sectors characterized by widespread 
bankruptcies, ma.ssive government interventions or nationalizations of 
private institutions and lCM danestic savings. The clearest example of 
this paradox is Chile, which has shCMn the world yet another road to a 
de facto socialized banking system. Argentina and Uruguay show similar 
trends, which can be detected less neatly in other developing countries, 
including Turkey. Indeed,even in the United States sane worried observers 
have warned against the dangers of pell-:rrell deregulation of commercial· 
banks (see Kareken 1981). 
The paper will first review dilerrrnas posed by intrinsic irrper­
fections of any financial market, and will look at legal prerequisites 
for the reasonably efficient operation of those markets. Then it will 
examine the stylized facts of sane Latin Arrerican exper:urents in financial 
liberalization, particularly those carried out in Southern Cone countries 
(Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) . Finally, alternative ways of organizing 
darestic capital markets under Latin American conditions will be discussed; 
policies regarding the links between domestic and international financial 
markets will also be considered. 
II. PECULIARITIES AND DILEMMAS FOUND IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Are banks special, and really all that different from butcher shops? 
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Neither type of firm is exactly like the textbook idealization of the 
atanistic firm operating in a perfectly canpetitive narket, where spot 
prices surmarize all information relevant for buyers and sellers of 
the product. Custarers at a butcher shop will not only look at price, 
but will also attempt to ascertain quality; in sare countries they will 
be aided by governrrent-established quality categories and certifications. 
Breakdowns in the trust consumers have on their butchers or on governrrent 
certification, say because of nnrors regarding neat tainted by poisonous 
substances,~ could produce a kind of "run" on butcher shops, and wide­
spread failures anong them. 
The caaparison is surely being forced. A butcher will seldom turn 
down a custarer who wants to buy with cash everything in sight at the 
price announced by the butcher (he will just make sure the cash is not 
counterfeit); a banker will surely not lend all a custarer wants to 
borrCM at the going interest rate. The fonrer is a spot transaction; 
the latter involves a pranise to repay in the future which may or may not 
be sincere or wholly credible. Enforcing the loan contract will involve 
costs, and even with speedy enforcercent the bank may be unable to get 
all of its m::>ney back. The bank will incur costs to explore the credit­
worthiness of borrowers; the butcher will not care much for the repu­
tation of cash-carrying custarers. There is no humanly possible way 
of devising a fail-proof system of finding out the true intentions of bor­
rowers, so lenders are likely to end up rationing credit, i.e. , putting a 
ceiling on what anus-length customers can borrow, regardless of their 
willingness to pay higher interest rates (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Financial intenrediaries rely on borrCMed funds; owners of 
those institutions typically invest their own capital only in arrounts 
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which are a small fraction of their total lending. A depositor in a 
bank will have the preoccupations a lender has when eyeing a borrower: 
will I be able to get not only the pranised yield but also my noney 
back as specified in the legal contract? In a totally unregulated 
system the rational depositor will attempt to process a great deal of 
information regarding financial institutions, balancing expected 
returns versus risks of not obtaining back his fl.mds as pranised. 
One can imagine a world in which all financial interrrediation 
is private and without any direct governrrent regulation. The infonna­
tional :imperfections would be partly offset by investrrents in 
information gathering by lenders and depositors; with the passing of 
tiJre reputations would be bu~lt up. Balance sheets of financial inter­
mediaries would be widely available and closely analyzed. It is even 
conceivable that possible econanies of scale involved in the processing 
of infonnation nay not be so large as to inpede large nurrrers of 
financial agents, assuring sorre carpetition anong them. Unexpected 
shocks and infonnational failures in this econany could of course lead 
to bankruptcies of sane financial intenrediaries; an infonred public 
presumably would know the source of such events, so there would be no 
ripple effects contaminating sounder institutions. One would expect to 
find a rich risk-return rrenu available to savers in this world, which 
would also generate an unregulated stock rnarket for those preferring 
equity arrangements for obtaining or investing funds. Concentration 
of econanic :rx,wer, in the fonn of "econanic groups" and conglorrerates, 
would presurnably exist only if there are econanies of scale to yield 
social benefits, with free entry checking nonopoly behavior. The market 
rate of interest would hover around the natural rab~. 
Note that even a purely laissez-faire financial system must 
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count with sare indirect governnent inputs in the fonn of an efficient 
and fair judiciary and police system to punish fraud and to handle 
the enforcenEnt of contracts and the settlerrent of disputes and 
bankruptcy cases. And behind that one must presumably have a polity 
generating such a judicial and police system, and a body of contract, 
antitrust and bankruptcy laws which are regarded as fair, efficient, and 
enforceable. Financial agents feeling a tenptation to cheat on their 
contracts or give false infonnation must know that such behavior will 
have very high costs; they must also know that even if they flee their 
country the long ann of the law is likely to reach them abroad. Govern­
nents in this world must be expected not to change nor corrupt these 
rules; darestic private citizens must not only believe in the stability 
of this system, but also believe that other citizens also have that belief. 
Foreign financial agents, when dealing with those of our country, must 
not expect to have these rules changed when things go wrong for them; 
foreign financial agents dealing within our econaey would presumably 
be subject to the same rules of the game as our financial agents. 
Even arrong those who find a predaninantly laissez-faire 
financial system not only imaginable but also a desirable goal of 
policy, there are differences on how to organize the underlying nonetary 
system. Sare take for granted that the goverrment will have a nonopoly 
in the supply of, cash and coins. Aware of the macroeconanic instability 
which could be generated by sudden changes in the public preferences 
between cash and the derrand deposits supplied by banks subject to 
fractional reserves, as during the early 1930s in the United States, 
these observers would impose 100 percent reserves on banks supplying 
those deposits, while leaving the rest of the financial system unregulated. 
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(See Friedman 1959). In this view, a significant difference exists 
between noney (cash plus demand deposits) and other financial assets. 
Other observers would carry a laissez-faire policy even into cash, 
eliminating the goverrurent nonopoly, and leaving individual agents 
free to choose anong all potential suppliers of cash, including foreign 
governrrents. In this approach there would be no need to i.npose 
reserve requirements on banks, which would be totally free of government 
regulations. The noney supply would presumably adjust to real needs, while 
price and wage flexibility would maintain macroeconanic balance(see Ha.11,1982). 
The laissez-faire vision also has (at least) two variants 
regarding how the unregulated dcmestic econany should nan.age its exchange 
rate. If the country is large enough, those giving the governrrent a 
nonopoly over the noney supply advocate a freely fluctuating exchange 
rate, with no restrictions on international trade nor on capital flows. 
If the country is small (with the borderline between large and small 
left fuzzy), even noney-rnonopolists favor sane fonn of fixed 
exchange rate system. For politically turbulent nations, a variant 
of the laissez-faire vision in small countries would do away with the 
local central bank, i.e.,. no national could be trusted with the noney 
nonopoly, which would be turned over to a presumably benign and 
responsible foreign goverrurent, as in the cases of Panama and Puerto Rico. 
No industrial country has care close to the laissez-faire vision, 
at least since the 1930s. The government nonopoly over cash has been 
maintained, while banks have been regulated and subjected to fractional 
reserve requirements. In the United States, an explicit federal 
deposit insurance was introduced during the 1930s and maintained since 
then, eliminating old-fashioned "runs" on banks. Like any other insurance 
scheme, deposit insurance is vulnerable to noral hazard consequences, 
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i.e., it induces depositors to think that "one bank is as good as 
another," and leads bank nana.gers to undertake riskier loans. To avoid 
such insurance-induced risk-taking, supervision over bank portfolios 
has accarpanied deposit insurance. Indeed, the Federal Reserve holds 
inpressive discretionary powers regarding the lending policies of 
c.c:.mnercial banks, and over their liquidation or nerger, if banks are 
found to be in trouble. Those discretionary p::,wers, however, are subject to 
review by the Congress and the courts. Vigilance has been exerted by the 
Federal Reserve to keep non-banking canpanies fran owning or controlling 
banks. While a trenci toward bank deregulation has occurred in the 
United States during the 1970s and early 1980s, few expect an elimination 
of deposit insurance, or of the prudential and ownership controls. 
Other industrial countries, such as Japan and those in Western 
Europe, are even farther away fran the laissez-faire vision for the 
financial system than the United States. In several of those countries 
interest rates are also controlled or supervised by nonetary authorities, 
and international capital flCMs are regulated. None relies on just 
price and wage flexibility to seek macroeconanic balance. (Note that 
those advocating a fixed-noney-growth rule are typically as skeptical 
of the speedy workings of price and wage flexibility to maintain 
macroeconanic balance as Keynesian econanists.) 
Finally, it is difficult to find small and open countries which 
have given~ nonetary sovereignty after tasting it. Politically sovereign 
countries using other countries' noneys, or "penranently" ccmnitted to a 
fixed exchange rate and unrestricted capital nobility with a nonetary 
"big brother," usually have cane to those arrangerrents as part of a 
transition from a colonial status, and it is noot whether the arrangements 
are regarded as really permanent or only as a step in nonetary learning 
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by doing, a step which had to be accepted to placate special internal and 
external interests rather than taken after a thoughtful consideration of 
national welfare. 
III. NCJI'ES 00 THE FINANCIAL lllSTORY OF LATIN AMERICA AND SOUrHERN CONE 
EXPERIMENTS. 
While the financial history of Latin America remains to be written, 
it appears that by the 1920s nost countries had succeeded in establishing 
camercial banks of the (then) traditional sort; several countries carried 
out banking refonns during those years following the advice of Professor 
E.W. Kermerer, of Princeton University, and of visitors fran the Bank 
of England. The banking system of South American countries already included 
institutions owned by national and provincial governments; Argentina, for 
exanple, had an important government-owned nortgage bank and several 
other public banks. The late 1920s were characterized in nost Latin 
American countries by fixed exchange rates, convertibility and price 
stability; darestic interest rates were closely linked to those in New 
York and wndon. Although there was no "financial repression," critics 
pointed out to a lack of ireditnn and long-tenn credit, particularly to 
finance industry and non-traditional agriculture. Dorrestic stock and 
lx>nd markets were small; only Argentina seems to have had a premising 
fonna.l cicm:stic financial market, daninated by nortgage paper. 
The 1930s brought exchange controls and the expansion of government 
financial institutions, which at the height of the crisis proved their 
usefulness in decreasing the incidence of panics and runs; the 
massive bank bankruptcies which occurred in the United States during 
the early 1930s were not witnessed in the large Latin American countries, 
apparently thanks to the presence of state banks plus an activist 
policy of rescuing nost private banks in trouble. By the 1940s many 
-8-
countries had developnent banks granting rredium and long tenn credits to 
non-traditional agriculture, industry and construction. Those credits, 
at least during the 1930s and early 1940s, seerred to have been granted 
at interest rates still ahead of darestic inflation, or at least not too 
far behind it, and in nost cases contributed to an upsurge in capital 
fonnation. 
By the 1950s,ha-1ever,it was clear that in South American countries exper­
iencing inflation the develoµnent banks created to solve one fonn of market failure 
(lack of long tenn credit for socially profitable non-traditional 
activities) had led to another, i.e., a segrrented darestic financial market 
in which Sate obtained (rationed) credits at very negative real interest 
rates, while non-favored borra-1ers had to obtain funds in expensive and 
unstable infonnal credit markets. Public controls over the banking system 
typically led to negative real interest rates for depositors. "Financial 
repression" became an obstacle to darestic savings and their efficient 
allocation, and financial intermediation languished. 
In inflation-prone countries, financial refonns were introduced 
during the 1960s in the fonn of indexing of sare loans and deposits; those 
involving the housing market were a particularly popular field for these 
new policies. Post-1964 Brazil is the clearest example of a sustained 
effort to revive the darestic financial system and darestic savings using 
a number of indexing devices, but maintaining close governrrent supervision 
of financial institutions and of interest rates charged infont1al markets. 
The results of the Brazilian refonns have been mixed: darestic financial 
savings have been encouraged relative to the pre-1964 situation·, in spite 
of continuing inflation and the new policies supported impressive rates 
of capital fonnation. But atterrpts to encourage a significant stock 
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narket have failed, and the financial narket remains heavily daninated by 
public securities. Private agents have shown reluctance to offer indexed 
securities. Credit to SCI'lE sectors, such as agriculture, has been 
heavily subsidized. Brazil has also retained.controls over the links 
between darestic and international financial rrarkets, while following 
a passive crawling peg exchange rate policy, with sporadic jurrps and 
other innovations. 
Southern Cone countries, caning out of sundry populist experiences 
around the mid-1970s, undertook financial refonns going beyond those 
of Brazil in a laissez-faire direction. Post-1973 Chile provides the 
clearest example of this type of financial liberation. That experi.nent 
started with a fully nationalized banking sector; a first task was to 
turn banks to the private sector. This was done by auctioning them off 
or by returning them to previous owners; apparently little effort was 
spent on investigatin<:I the banking credentials of new entrants. At an 
early stage interest rates were freed and "financieras" were al].owed to 
operate with practically no restrictions or supervisions; early bankruptcies 
around 1976-1977 of the rrore adventurous and unregulated "financieras" 
led to the establishm:mt of minimum capital requirsrents for entry. 
Authorities repeatedly warned the public that deposits were not guaranteed, 
and that financial intennediaries, like any other private firm, could 
go bankrupt; it was explicitly stated that there would not be a "bailing 
out" of banks and other financial interrrediaries. 
During 1977 it becarre apparent that an important bank (the Banco 
Osorno) was in serious trouble. The authorities, fearing that its 
bankruptcy "v.Duld tarnish external and internal confidence on Chilean 
financial institutions, intervened, and rescued depositors and the 
institution. Apparently, the fear that external loans would decrease 
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if the Osorno were allCMed to go bankrupt was the crucial argurrent for 
intervention. Naturally, fresh warnings were issued that, fran then on, 
financial intenrediaries would not be rescued. At that stage practically 
no inspection :or supervision of bank portfolios existed. One may con­
jecture that after this event depositors felt, de facto, fully insured 
and foreign lenders felt that their loans to the private Chilean sector 
were, in fact, guaranteed by the state. 
During 1979 the Chilean econanic authorities started a process 
expected to culminate in a pseudo-exchange-rate union with the United 
States (see Carden 1972). The naninal exchange rate was fixed in July 
1979, and restrictions over convertibility and capital novenents were 
relaxed; by 1981 those restrictions had been considerably weakened, and 
Chile witnessed a massive capital inflow. Presumably the hope was to 
make lending to Chile subject to no nore currency risk than lending to 
Puerto Rico or Panama; the naninal exchange rate was supposed to last 
"for many years." Sane of the econanic authorities dreamed with doing 
away with the national currency altogether, but feared that the military 
may not wish to go that far. 
The theoretical underpinnings of these policies included an 
extrerre version of the nonetary approach to the balance of payrrents, 
plus the hypothesis that financial markets, darestic and international, 
were no different fran the market for apples and neat. Voluntary 
financial transactions between private agents were their own business, 
and presumably Pareto-optimal. Indeed, the nationality of those 
private agents was regarded as alrrost irrelevant. The then Director of 
the Western Hemisphere Division of the International MJnetary Fund put 
it this way at a neeting held in Santiago de Chile during January 1980: 
-11-
"In the case of the private sector, I would argue that 
the difference between darestic and foreign debt is not sig­
nificant--barring goverrnrental interference with the transfer 
of service payments or other clearly inappropriate public 
policies--if it exists at all. The exchange risks associated 
with foreign borrowing are presurrably taken into account as 
are the other risks associated with borrowing, whether it 
be fran darestic or foreign sources. MJre generally, private 
finns can be expected to be careful in assessing the net 
return to be derived fran borrCMed funds as canpared with 
the net cost since their survival as enterprises is at stake." 
(See Robichek 1981, p.171). 
The sane author 'Went on to argue that overborrowing by the private 
sector, even with official guarantees, was very unlikely, provided 
official guarantees were given on a selective basis; only public borrowing 
on international financial markets was regarded as posing the more 
serious debt service risks (see Robichek 1981, p.172.) 
Convergence of darestic inflation and interest rates toward 
international ones proved to be a slow process, during which the fixed 
"pennanent" naninal exchange rate yielded great incentives for private 
capital inflows into Chile: during 1981 the current account deficit 
reached an astonishing 14 percent of Chilean Gross National Product, 
while darestic savings appeared to collapse. The process of financial 
liberation had also led to a widely noted concentration of potential 
econanic power in the hands of a few conglarerates or econanic groups, 
which canbined financial and non-financial corporations. Before 1981, 
the official view seems to have been that those econanic groups must 
reflect SOitE econanies of scale, and could be regarded as one special 
type of butcher shop, disciplined by free entry and other competitive 
pressures. Their allocation of credit resources, often heavily loaded 
to canpanies associated with the group, was presurred to be more efficient 
than that which governrrent bureaucrats could achieve. 
As late as March 1981 international business publications were 
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writing that "Chile's free-enterprise banking enviromnent" was proving 
to be a pcMerful rragnet for foreign banks, and that nore entrants into 
the thriving sector were lining up. (See Business Latin Arrerica, 
M:rrch 11, 1981, p. 79. ) By June 1981 the sane publications were noting 
with concern the cessation of payments on local credits by CFAV, a 
Chilean sugar carpany, as well as other blemishes on the econanic miracle, 
but argued that ·"the problem areas pose no imrediate threat to growth" 
(Business Latin America, June 3, 1981, p .173. ) Following the CFAV news, 
the Central Bank supported financial institutions to stern incipient "runs." 
By November 1981 the position of two inportant private Chilean banks 
and several financieras became critical: they were "intervened" by the 
Central Bank. Further interventions of financial intennediaries occurred 
during the first half of· 1982; rather than harsh bankruptcy proceedings,. 
these actions apparently involved a generous expansion of credit to 
the private sector. Between the end of December 1981 and the end of 
June 1982, danestic credit in Chilean pesos expanded by 41 percent; of 
the net increase in danestic credit, 92 percent went to the private 
sector (see International Monetary Fund, 1983, p.118-119 ,lines 32 and 32d). 
By late 1981 and early 1982 Chile was also feeling the full 
force of the international econanic crisis, and discovering that it 
was not a "snall country" in international financial rrarkets, in the 
sense of being able to borrow, in either public or private account, all 
it wished at a given interest rate, even including a generous spread. 
Pressures nounted on the already overvalued ncrninal exchange rate, fixed 
since July 1979; in June 1982 the unthinkable devaluation was carried 
out in haste, initiating a period of experirrentation, which has included 
clean and dirty floating, a crawling peg, multiple rates, and a tightening 
up of exchange controls. 
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The official exchange rate rose rapidly fran 39 pesos per U.S. 
dollar to a range of 74-80 pesos by January 1983; the free rate went 
substantially above official quotations. Those who had dollar debts 
were placed under stress; financial difficulties were aggravated by 
a drop in real Gross National Product of about 15 percent during 
1982. The Central Bank undertook rescue operations of banks and 
other financial intenrediaries during the second half of 1982, to avoid 
a breakdown of the financial system. In January 1983 a controversial, 
massive intervention of banks, other financial intennediaries and private 
corporations took place, leaving the governrcent in control of a good 
share of the Chilean corporate sector, as well as of its danestic and 
foreign debts. During the first quarter of 1983 it was unclear how 
far this new wave of interventions would go, nor how would the govern­
rrent go about disposing of the intervened assets and liabilities. Many of 
those linked to the intervened banks and associated canpanies, including 
ex-Ministers of the Pinochet regirre, charged that the January 1983 
neasures by the Central Bank and its now active superintendency of 
banks were unnecessary, arbitrary and politically motivated, hinting 
that rival econanic groups stood to profit fran the measures. General 
Pinochet himself took the lead in charging the troubled econanic groups 
with a number of sins, including betrayal of the General's good faith. 
Whatever the merits of these charges and countercharges, it was 
clear that the danestic financial crisis in Chile had questioned not 
only the future of many existing banks and corporations but also the 
rules of the game as they had been understood during the years of the 
"Chilean miracle." The opaqueness of the intervention procedures, and 
of the announced processes to settle the tangled web of inter-conpany 
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and bank debts even raised questions alx>ut the regim2's respect for 
property rights or at least its willingness to provide effective 
nechanisrns for the efficient exercise of those rights. 
The 1982-83 breakdown of rules, and the reliance on discretion 
by Chilean officials extended to the handling of private external debts. 
In contrast with other heavy borrcmers, such as Brazil, a large share 
of the pre-1982 capital inflow into Chile went directly to private banks 
and corporations, borrowing--abroad without governrrent guarantees. Indeed, 
both private borrowers and lenders were warned by governrrent officials 
that they were on their own, and that such debt could in no way be 
regarded as a Chilean national debt. :tn spite of these ex-ante announce­
nEnts, during early 1983 those private external debts were taken over 
by the governrrent, which announced its intention to continue servicing 
them. The private debts have been included in the debt rescheduling being 
negotiated between the Chilean state and the foreign bank advisory can-
mittee for Chile. .Apparently the Chilean governrrent caved in under 
pressure fran the bank advisory corrmittee, which argued that it would 
be extremely difficult for the international financial carmunity to 
focus its attention on the pressing needs of Chile while an increasing 
number of canpanies and their associated Chilean banks were experiencing 
or approaching a suspension of their payments and subsequent bank-
ruptcy. To make their viewp::,int absolutely clear, foreign banks 
apparently tightened up their granting of ve:ry short tenn cc:mrercial 
credits to Chile during the first quarter of 1983, a technique reportedly 
used with sare success ten years earlier vis-a-vis the sarre country. 
The International M:metary Fund, also active in the debt rescheduling 
exercise, has not publicly objected to this threat to the Robichek doctrine. 
· 
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In sum, the ad hoc actions undertaken during 1982-83 in Chile to 
handle the danestic and external financial crisis carry with them an 
enonrous potential for arbitrary wealth redistribution. The lessons 
private agents are likely to draw fra:n these events are unlikely to 
be canpatible with a reconstruction of a darestic financial sector 
relying on credible threats of bankruptcy to discipline borrCMing and 
lending. In spite of the ex-post gover:rarent guarantees to peso deposits, 
private individuals have sharply decreased their demand for peso­
dena:ninated assets, as danestic inflation picks up, and expectations 
grow that the clearing up of the danestic debt tangle will involve 
substantial additional inflation. Faith in orderly judicial proceedings 
to clear up debts and claims on assets appears to be quite low; stories 
abound of debtors fleeing the country, and of petty and grand financial 
chicanecy going unpunished. It may be noted that these events have 
occurred even though the public sector budget deficit was nonexistent 
or miniscule for several years through 1981, and noderate during 1982. 
(For evidence on the Chilean fiscal perfonnance, see McKinnon 1982.) 
Argentine and Uruguayan danestic financial experiences offer 
a number of similarities to the narrated Chilean events. In those 
countries darestic financial intenrediation flourished and then collapsed. 
Ma.jor similarities are the following: 
1. Whether or not deposits are explicitly insured, the public 
expects governments to intervene to save at least small depositors fran 
losses when financial intenrediaries run into trouble. Warnings that 
intervention will not be forthca:ning appear to be simply not believable. 
2. The Central Banks, either because of a misguided belief that 





neglected prudential regulations over financial intermediaries. Not 
surprisingly, the assets held by Southern Cone banks and financieras 
around 1980-81 appeared to have been substantially riskier than those 
held by similar institutions in the United States or in Western Europe. 
3. The new financial institutions in the Southern Cone 
attracted fresh entrepreneurs and stimulated the creation of new con­
glarerates and econanic groups. While new entrepreneurial blood has 
an attractive aura, experience indicates that such venturesane animal 
spirits are better channeled tc:Mard non-financial endeavors, where 
the disciplining threat of bankruptcy could be rcore credible. 
4. In econanies characterized by intractable market and infonna­
tional inperfections, conglanerates and econanic groups, even as they 
correct sane of those inperfections, could exacerbate others, par­
tieularly via the creation of nonopoly power. 
5. The freeing of interest rates and the relaxation of controls 
over financial intennediation will not necessarily encourage inter­
mediation beyond short tenn maturities. The flourishing of private 
financial intermediaries in the Southern Cone, even at the height of 
the boan, was limited to deposits and loans of less than six nonths 
duration. IDnger te:rm intennediation via banks or bonds, not to 
IIEI1tion via active stock markets, remained very weak. 
6. While the end of financial repression undoubtedly encouraged 
certain types of financial savings, its net effect on total dorrestic 
savings, and on danestic private invest:rrent and its efficiency remain 
noot. The Chilean private invest:rrent record during the 1970s was 
rather unimpressive, while its record on national savings remained 
appalling, in spite of the new incentives (see Harberger 1982.) Argentine 
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perfonnance was not IlR.lch better; Uruguay seems to have a relatively 
better record on this account. 
7. Foreign lenders take governrrent announcerrents that it will 
not rescue local private debtors with non-guaranteed external (or 
dacestic) liabilities even less seriously than depositors take the threat 
of a loss of their m::mey. The alleged Japanese attitude of not differen­
tiating between the public and private external debt of a developing 
country appears to have been upheld ~-~ as a sounder guide to action 
than the Robichek doctrine. Foreign banks lending to both the public 
and private sectors of a country have considerable leverage to con­
vince goverrnrents to take over ex-post bad private debts. There appears 
to be no international referees to keep them from exercising such 
leverage. The substantive differences between the nationalization of 
Mexican private banks during 1982 and the intervention of Chilean private 
banks during 1983 may be less than one would think by reading the 
editorials of the international financial press. 
8. The canbination of a pre-announced or fixed nominal exchange 
rate, relatively free capital rroverrents, and darestic and external 
financial systems characterized by the rroral hazard and other .iillperfections 
discussed above set the stage not only for significant microeconomic 
misallocation of credit, but also for macroeconomic instability, including 
the explosive growth of external debt, follc:Med by abrupt cessation of 
capital inflCMs. Such macroeconomic instability would occur even 
assuming tranquil external circumstances, but it is of course exacerbated 
by external shocks hitting economies made particularly brittle and 
vulnerable by that combination of policies and institutions. 
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9. While it remains a puzzle why real interest rates in the 
Southern Cone countries remained so high even during periods of massive 
capital inflCM, it is clear that a relatively unregulated darestic 
financial system gives no assurance of real interest rates hovering 
around reasonable estimates of the socially optimal shadow real 
interest rate. Indeed, the vulnerability and nnral hazard imperfections 
of such a financial system may help explain ex-wst the extravagant 
real interest rates registered in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay during 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
IV. OPI'ICNS FOR LATIN AMERICAN I>Cl1ESTIC FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
Southern Cone danestic financial systems of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s ended up with a pessimum "middle way": de facto public 
guarantees to depositors, lenders and oorrCMers, and no effective supervision 
and control (until it was too late) of the practices of financial inter­
nediaries. Refonn could logically head in two opposite directions: 
nore laissez faire with binding (constitutional?) ccmni:tments against 
future bail-outs, or toward m:::>re public controls, possibly culminating 
in nationalization of the banking system, as in Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
India and France. Other Latin Alrerican countries outside the 
Southern Cone, such as Brazil and Colanbia, have darestic financial 
systems that, while shc:Ming signs of stress during the last few years, 
have not undergone Southern-cone-type of crises; their experiences 
could be useful in sketching desirable characteristics of darestic 
financial arrangercents. 
As noted earlier, the credibility of a governrrent carmitrrent to 
a truly laissez-faire darestic financial system is very low. Firstly, 
as illustrated in the recent Chilean experience, foreign financial agents 
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will not accept a separation of private and public debts when a crisis 
arrives; financial laissez-faire in one peripheral country does not 
seem viable. Secondly "public opinion," including generals and their 
aunts, sinply does not believe that the state would (nor could) allCM 
small depositors to be wiped out by the failure of banks and financial 
intenrediaries. It may be that private financial agents, danestic and 
foreign, lenders, borrowers and intermediaries, whether or not related 
to generals, know that the danestic political and judicial systems are 
not canpatible with laissez-faire ccmnit:Irents which a misguided Minister 
of Finance or Central Bank President may occasionally utter in a m:::!reilt 
of dogmatic exaltation. When a crisis hits, agents will reason, bank­
ruptcy courts will break down; when irost everyone (who counts) is bank­
rupt~ nobody is! Thus, even if one believed, a la Hayek, that the 
externalities and public good characteristics of the danestic rronetary 
and financial system are negligible, one may conclude that the political, 
judicial, and social infrastructure found in many developing (and 
developed?) countries conspires against the viability of such a pure 
laissez-faire financial system. The zealot may conclude that the 
nation does not m=asure up to the purity of the rrodel. 
So should one rrove back to good old 1950s style financial 
repression, extensive controls and perhaps full nationalization of the 
danestic financial system? It can be argued that a believable alter­
native system could be designed, avoiding many of the inefficiencies 
of financial repression while avoiding those of the Southern Cone 
experience, and blending both public and private financial agents. 
What follc:Ms sketches sorre features of that eclectic system. 
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Negative real rates of interest becane camon in Latin Arrerica 
during the 1940s and 1950s as inflation gained m:rcenturn and many 
nonetary authorities maintained ceilings on naninal interest rates offered 
and charged by the banking and financial system. At that tirre nost 
South Arrerican countries (but not M:xico, Central America and the 
Caribbean) also maintained extensive exchange controls. Limited 
international capital nobility also buttressed the taxing of cash 
balances and financial repression; the then prevalent Keynesian orthodoxy 
also encouraged these develo:Effl=Ilts. While persistently negative real 
rates of interest in the fo11'llcl.l financial market occurred only when 
the government inposed rate ceilings and exchange controls, it is not 
obvious that public regulation and participation in the darestic financial 
market necessarily had to lead to negative real rates of interest. The 
M:xican financial system of the 1950s and 1960s, praised by develo:Effl=Ilt 
scholars, contained lx>th public institutions and substantial government 
regulations. As already noted, the post-1964 Brazilian indexing and 
other financial refo:rms could hardly be described as involving a 
laissez-faire approach. The celebrated South Korean financial refo:rms 
of the 1960s were carried out with a high degree of public ownership 
and control of the fo11'llcl.l financial sector (see Gurley et al 1965, p.45). 
Assuming that a country intends to maintain nonetary sovereignty 
but that significant, yet not explosive, inflationary expectations 
persist, there is a strong case for making sure that private agents 
have available a danestic liquid financial asset yielding a real interest 
rate which is not far belCM,nor Irn.lch above, zero. The inflationary tax 
borne by currency balances may result fran the inability of the fiscal 
system to find non-inflationary sources of revenues, or it may be simply 
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a by-product of an inflationary spiral, whose inertial m:::menturn could 
only be halted by a severe real contraction. Presumably the transactions 
convenience provided by dorrestic currency will be enough to generate 
sane demand for it, even under m:xlerate inflation, an assumption sup­
ported by South Arrerican experiences. But without a liquid and safe 
store of value denaninated in darestic currency, which at least maintains 
its purchasing power, a national nonetary and financial system will have 
little long run credibility, short of draconian controls. It could 
also be argued that without such an asset the system would not :rreet 
the nost elerrentary tests of social equity. 
There are many possible ways to supply such an asset. The 
banking system, for example, could provide indexed savings accounts; 
depending on practical considerations,they could be used partly as 
checking accounts. At least that segment of the banking system would 
have explicit and full deposit insurance, perhaps only for accounts 
below a certain (generous) limit; insurance for larger accounts could 
be partial. Naturally, the use by banks of funds coming from those 
accounts would be tightly regulated by a flinty-eyed superintendency 
of banks. Indeed, practical considerations could lead to the requirerrent 
of 100 per cent reserves on that type of deposits, to be placed in 
very safe assets. 
Enonrous potential power is given by this scherre to the regulatory 
agencies: it could end up in the total control of credit by the 
Central Bank. Experiences in I.a.tin America and elsewhere with a public 
nonopoly of credit have not been so encouraging as to rrake one indif­
ferent to this possibility. Safeguards against the rronopoly scenario 
would include allowance for the supply of alternative financial assets, 
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by either private agents or decentralized public ones, plus an active 
Congressional supervision of the regulatory agencies and the public 
banks. The latter point suggests that demxracy, whatever its rrore 
fundalrental virtues, is an important technical input for a healthy darestic 
financial system. 
Suppliers of riskier financial assets would not have available 
public deposit insurance but would be subject to less regulation. Never­
theless, these would still include minimum capital requirements, strict 
"transparency" info:ana.tional rules (regarding both assets and connections 
with other finns), and clear "risk-may-be-hazardous-for-your-health" 
warnings to the general public. After recent experiences it is probably 
better to proceed cautiously in this segrrent of the darestic financial 
market, but not so cautiously as to make it an empty set. Interest rates 
offered and charged by these intencediaries would be expected to show 
significant real rates; at least on an experinental basis those rates 
would not be set by the nonetary authorities, but spreads between active 
and passive rates would be subject to antitrust vigilance (as entry into 
this sector would not be canpletely free). Those spreads would depend, 
inter alia, on possible official reserve requirenents; these could be 
presumed to be quite low for this segrrent of the market. Both foreign and 
private institutions would be expected to participate, but entry regu­
lations and antitrust vigilance would be on guard against interlocking 
directorates arrong financial and non-financial finns and would lean against 
the creation of daninating econanic groups and conglarerates. Prohibitions 
against the mingling of financial and non-financial finns, as in the 
United States' Glass-Steagall Act, appear particularly desirable where 
markets are relatively sma.11. 
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Latin Arrerican experience, and indeed that of Continental Europe 
last century, makes one skeptical that private markets alone will 
generate a flow of financial interrrediation high enough to support 
a rate of long term fixed capital fonnation which fully exploits available 
high social rates of return to long tenn investzrents. Private uncer­
tainties and skepticism of all sorts, which cannot be easily renoved 
even if one eliminates financial repression, reduce the scope for private 
long tenn finance and for stock markets; the latter have continued to 
languish even when encouraged by various subsidies, as in Brazil. 
It will be recalled that this was the original rrotivation for the creation 
of public developrent banks in Latin America during the 1930s and 1940s. 
The need remains to close gaps left in long tenn capital markets by 
acute uncertainties found in Latin American societies, and public 
developrent banks remain a plausible solution, in spite of the abuses 
and errors in their managerrent registered over the last fifty years. 
Not all experiences have been negative; as noted earlier, public 
rrortgage banks obtaining funds by issuing indexed obligations yielding 
nodest real rates of interest and correspondingly pricing their rrortgages, 
have registered inp:>rtant accomplishments in a number of countries. The 
crucial lessons remain the avoidance of real interest rates too far 
fran plausible estimates of the shadow opportunity cost of capital, 
plus political mechanisms to check potential abuses of those public 
agencies. 
Decentralized, efficiently-run public financial intennediaries 
operating together with private intermediaries could play several 
inp:>rtant functions, besides merely plugging gaps in the long-tenn 
segment of the market. As recent Latin American experiences have shown, 
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confinning the evidence of the early 1930s, during financial crises the 
public appears to turn to public banks for greater security. Public 
banks could help focus narket interest rates around the social oppor­
tunity cost of capital, decreasing instability in real interest rates. 
'Ibose institutions could channel external funds, helping to keep tabs 
on the foreign debt and improve borrCMing tenns. Their operating costs 
\\lOuld give evidence and provide a yardstick on reasonable spreads 
between active and passive interest rates. By providing long tenn 
credit to new, non-traditional activities, developrent banks would 
eliminate one of the excuses frequently given for extravagant protection 
against inports. Indeed, the valid cases for infant-industry protection 
or prarotion are likely to be nost efficiently handled under Latin 
1-\mirrican conditions using public credit instruments, suitably priced, 
rather than by barriers against imports. Needless· to say, public banks 
will not yield these results without a great deal of effort and pressure 
by those in charge of their manageirent and supervision. Considerable 
experilrentation is also likely to be needed, particularly regarding 
the establishrrent of a structure of interest rates canpatible with 
both a vigorous rate of fixed capital forrration and a matching flow 
of voluntary darestic savings. 
The real exchange rate, no less than the real interest rate, 
remains a crucial price for Latin American econanies. The Southern 
Cone emphasis on exchange rate rnanageirent as an instrument to achieve 
naninal targets, letting narket forces settle the real exchange 
rate, energes fran recent experience as less successful than the 
Brazilian-Colanbian crawling peg practice, which targets the real 
exchange rate as an explicit objective of policy. As with the real 
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interest rate, the correct real exchange rate is not easy to define and 
calculate exactly, but grossly over- or under-valued real exchange rates, 
like giraffes, are not so difficult to recognize on sight. "The 
correct real exchange rate" would be that canpatible with expected 
current~account deficits, output levels and long tenn capital inflows, 
given carmercial and other policies. These are real considerations; 
what about the role of the exchange rate (and of expected changes in its 
naninal level) as a crucial link between danestic and international 
financial markets, and its impact on the capital account of the balance 
of payments? 
Darestic policies targetting real interest rates and real 
exchange rates will not be corrpatiblewith free or untaxed capital 
novenents and unrestricted convertibility, except by fluke (or short 
of extravagant average levels of reserves). This is not a pleasant 
conclusion for those familiar with past experiences with exchange 
controls over international financial flows in Latin Atrerica or elsewhere. 
Lirnitations on unconditional capital-account convertibility, however, 
rna.y have greater or SITB.ller inefficiencies and inequities-depending 
on the context in which they are undertaken. A real exchange rate 
hovering around its long-run equilibril.llll level will do much to reduce 
pressure on convertibility limitations; it would be absolutely essential 
to avoid the temptation of rna.nipulating convertibility restrictions 
to buttress overvalued exchange rates, as in the past. Note, incidentally, 
that even without convertibility restrictions overvalued exchange 
rates can be propped by rna.nipulating the capital account of the 
balance of payirents, i.e. , high interest rates went along in the 
Southern Cone with the atraso carnbriario. 
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The prudential regulatory machinery could be used to discourage 
volatile international financial flCMs relying primarily on taxes or 
tax-like requirements, i.e. , via special reserve requirements for 
certain types of unwanted international financial transactions, as is 
the practice in several Western European countries. Taxes would also 
be expected to capture arbitrage profits fran borrCMing abroad and 
lending dcnestically, llD:(ler "nonnal" circumstances. Persistent sub­
sidies to encourage foreign borrCMing would be a sign that either the 
real exchange rate or danestic real interest rates have drifted from 
their equil:ilirium levels. 
Unrestrained convertibility in the capital account is in fact a 
luxury, desirable in itself, enjoyed only by a handful of countries 
which have eitl?,er a very developed or a very underdeveloped danestic 
financial system. It is neither the usual practice in OEx::D countries 
(see Bertrand 1981) , nor was it the expectation of at least sane of 
the architects of the Bretton Woods system (see Crotty 1983). So long as 
danestic currency balances may be burdened byan inflation tax higher 
than those levied on foreign currencies, sare limitations on con­
vert:iliility are widely perceived as a necessary part of transitional 
policy package (see for example M::Kinnon and Mathieson 1981). 
The case for sare limitations on free capital account rrovements 
rests partly on macroeconanic considerations, partly on the need 
to correct rnicroeconanic ircperfections on darestic and international 
financial markets. Events during 1982 llUlst have put an end to the 
notion that there are srrall countries in international financial 
markets, in the sense that those countries could borrow all they 
want at a given interest rate. Currency and sovereign risks will 
-27-
inevitably tilt the supply schedule of foreign funds to any country 
in an upward-sloping direction, and may even give it a kinkier look, 
so that there will be a gap between private and social costs of 
borrCMing (see Harberger 1981 for a clear, but apparently unheeded, 
exposition). Moral-hazard considerations on both sides of the market, 
or expectations of bail-outs, reinforce the case for heme-country 
supervision of international financial flc:Ms; if hare countries do 
not undertake that supervision others will do it for them. 
These considerations also cast doubt on the desirability of 
allc:Ming the darestic financial system to offer deposits denaninated 
in foreign currencies, either to darestic residents or to foreigners. 
Such deposits sharply curtail the freedom of maneuver of :rconetary 
authorities, for the sake of maintaining the credibility and reputation 
of the banks offering them. (The point is partly applicable to any 
country whose banks have an international scope, even if deposits 
are denaninated in hare currency). The Mexican and Uruguayan experiences 
suggest that deposits denominated in foreign currencies enhance 
vulnerability to crises, introducing the likelihood of sharp dis­
continuities in the rules of the garre. At any rate, in general that 
type of deposit would not be conpatible with limitations on capital 
account convertibility, limitations which would also rule out the 
feasibility of a totally clean float for the exchange rate, including 
both spot and future quotations. 
V. A FINAL CAVEAT 
Recent Chilean experience shows that a balanced budget by itself 
will prevent neither a serious financial crisis nor acute macroeconomic 
turbulence. Yet previous Chilean experiences, and those of other Latin 
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American countries, also shcM that fiscal extravagance is a sure way 
to bring about not only econanic dislocation, but also the weakening 
and even collapse of fragile dercocratic institutions. This paper 
has discussed neither fiscal policy nor strategies on how to eliminate 
inflation. Implicitly, it has assumed that Latin American inflations 
may be sustained by nany sources, not just budgetary laxity, and 
that in nost countries for the foreseeable future "living with 
inflation" will be a nore credible policy goal than el:iminating it, 
and that this must be taken into account when designing desirable 
darestic financial policies, as well as other measures. 
Nevertheless, there are inflations (and budget deficits) which 
no danestic financial system with a minimum of coherence could live 
with. Examples include inflations which accelerate for nore than, 
say, three years in a row, reaching levels above one hundred per cent 
per annum, or inflationary rates which fluctuate unpredictably fran 
year to year. Under either circumstance relative prices will becare 
ve:ry volatile, and real and financial calculations ve:ry difficult. 
In contrast, the Colanbian experience of the last ten years or so 
provides an exanple of an inflation which is fairly predictable and 
relatively easy to live with. Finally, it would be nearly inpossible 
to design reasonable financial systems, in a mixed-econany context, 
which could be canpatible with sustained public.expenditures and 
budget deficits of the magnitude of those registered in Chile during 
1971-72, in Argentina during 1974-75, or in M=xico during 1981-82. 
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